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When the central banker’s loss function is asymmetric, changes in the volatility of
inﬂation and/or unemployment aﬀect equilibrium inﬂation. This suggests that changing
macroeconomic volatilities may be an important driving force behind trends in observed
inﬂation. Previous evidence, which has oﬀered support for this idea, suﬀers from a
spurious regression problem. Once this problem is controlled for, the evidence suggests
that the volatility of unemployment does not help explain inﬂation outcomes. There
is some evidence of a relationship between inﬂation and its volatility, but overall the
data does not support the view that changing economic volatility, as ﬁltered through
asymmetric central bank preferences, is an important driver of inﬂation trends.
KEYWORDS: Inﬂation, Monetary Policy, Asymmetric Loss Function.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E50, E611 Introduction
It is well known that U.S. inﬂation was low in the early 1960s, rose through the late
1960s and 1970s before falling through the 1980s, and remaining low thereafter. A similar
pattern of rising then falling inﬂation occurred in many other OECD countries.1 What
caused this rise and fall of inﬂation is an open question that has attracted a great deal of
recent attention. While the literature to date has largely focused on the U.S. experience, the
existence of a common pattern in inﬂation suggests that any successful explanation ought
to be robust across OECD countries.
In this paper we ask to what extent the common observed inﬂation trend in OECD
countries is the result of the interaction of time inconsistency problems in monetary policy
interacting with changes in the volatility of shocks to inﬂation and/or unemployment. This
is a promising candidate explanation of inﬂation trends for a number of reasons. First, it is
well known that the degree of macroeconomic volatility has fallen along with the level of in-
ﬂation in many OECD countries in recent years.2 Thus the decline in OECD inﬂation rates
is roughly coincident with the so-called Great Moderation. Second, standard time inconsis-
tency models of monetary policy, extended to allow for asymmetric central bank preferences,
provide a clear theoretical channel through which these factors would aﬀect trend inﬂation.
Since these models abstract away from country speciﬁc institutional details, the theory nat-
urally extends from the U.S. case to the cross country setting. Third, both the comments
of policy insiders3 as well as formal empirical work on monetary policy reaction functions4
support the key feature of these models: that central bank preferences are asymmetric.
Finally, existing research explicitly examining the relationship between asymmetric central
bank preferences and inﬂation outcomes appears to support the hypothesis.5
We begin the paper by documenting the existence of a common trend in the inﬂation
rates of OECD other than the U.S.. Figures 1-12 plot inﬂation rates, measured by annualized
quarterly percentage changes in the Consumer Price Index, for 12 OECD countries. For
1See Rogoﬀ (2003), Cicarelli & Mojon (2008), and Doyle & Falk (2008).
2Blanchard & Simon (2000), Stock & Watson (2003)
3Blinder (1997, 1998) and Goodhart (1998).
4Reduced form tests for asymmetries in policy reaction functions include Bec, Ben Salem, & Collard
(2002), Kim, Osborn, & Sensier (2002), Martin & Milas (2004), Karagedikli & Lees (2004), and Bruinshoofd
& Candelon (2005). Tests based on more structural models include Surico (2004, 2003), Dolado, Maria-
Dolores, & Naviera (2005), Dolada, Maria-Dolores, & Ruge-Murcia (2004), and Aguiar & Martins (2008).
5Ruge-Murcia (2004), Surico (2006).
1comparison, a 2-year centered moving average of U.S. inﬂation is included on each plot (the
dashed red line) A common pattern is visible in the raw data (the light blue line), but more
transparent in the 2-year centered moving averages also displayed in the ﬁgures (the heavy
blue line), and is as follows: inﬂation starts out low in the early 1960s in most countries.
This is followed by a period of rising inﬂation lasting until the late 1970s or early 1980s in
all countries except Germany and Japan (where inﬂation peaks in the early and mid 1970s
respectively). After this period of rising inﬂation, inﬂation rates then fall until the present,
and are generally as low or lower by the end of the 1990s than they were in the early 1960s.
The commonality of inﬂation outcomes over the past four decades suggests that a successful
explanation of long run inﬂation trends ought to be applicable across OECD countries.
Theories of time inconsistent monetary policy based on asymmetric central bank pref-
erences are a plausible candidate explanation of this common trend as these models are
general enough to encompass the diﬀering institutional arrangements across OECD coun-
tries. While early versions of these models required the policy makers target an unattainable
unemployment rate, recent theoretical innovations show that monetary policy may suﬀer
from time inconsistency even when central bankers target the NAIRU. When central banks
have asymmetric preferences, policy makers care about the sign as well as the magnitude of
deviations of unemployment and inﬂation from target. In this case, monetary policy suﬀers
from a time inconsistency problem which causes equilibrium inﬂation rates to depend on
the variance of the shocks to inﬂation and unemployment.6
Consider, by way of illustration, a policy maker who dislikes above NAIRU unemploy-
ment more than below NAIRU unemployment, and suppose that the variance of shocks
to unemployment increases. With a higher variance, the probability of an episode of very
high (and, due to the asymmetry of preferences, strongly disliked) unemployment increases.
The central banker will respond with expansionary monetary policy, in an attempt to drive
the average unemployment rate down, to reduce the likelihood of an episode of very high
unemployment. This policy, however, results in an increase in equilibrium inﬂation. Given
the asymmetry in the loss function, the policy maker would be willing to pay this price to
avoid a more distasteful episode of very high unemployment.7
6Cukierman (1999), Ruge-Murcia(2003a), Gerlach (2003), and Nobay & Peel (2003).
7With rational expectations, of course, this policy response is anticipated by agents, and produces the
rise in inﬂation with no oﬀsetting change in average unemployment.
2A natural test of this theory is to use a GARCH model to estimate the conditional
variance of shocks to unemployment and/or inﬂation and then regress inﬂation on this
conditional variance to measure any correlation. The results of this simple exercise support
the proposition that asymmetric preferences and changing volatility can explain inﬂation
trends in at least some OECD countries.8 We argue that ﬁndings, based on this test, that
changes in the conditional volatility of unemployment have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on changes in inﬂation are likely spurious, as these results are found in those countries for
which the conditional variance is most persistent. We employ Monte Carlo methods to show
that, when inﬂation is persistent, as it is in most OECD countries, simple regressions of
inﬂation on the conditional volatility of unemployment over-reject a correct null hypothesis
of no relationship if the conditional volatility of unemployment also exhibits persistence.
To ﬁx this problem, we re-do the analysis two ways: ﬁrst by estimating the model
in diﬀerences of inﬂation and the conditional variance of unemployment, and second by
estimating the model as a cointegrating relationship. The results from these exercises
suggest that changes in the conditional variance of unemployment do not explain changes
in inﬂation. When estimating the model in diﬀerences, the model ﬁts the data only for
Austria. The cointegration results are marginally more positive, as we ﬁnd support for the
model in three countries out of a sample of 13. To control for the possibility of changes in
central banks’ inﬂation targets, we repeat the exercise for a more recent subsample of data,
where a constant inﬂation target is a more plausible assumption. This does not change
the results. Overall the implication is that the combination of asymmetric central bank
preferences and changes in the volatility of unemployment is not a promising explanation
of time series inﬂation trends in OECD countries.
We then examine the relationship between inﬂation and its conditional variance in time
series data for OECD countries to allow for the possibility that central bank preferences are
asymmetric in inﬂation, rather than unemployment. Again we estimate the model using
both ﬁrst diﬀerencing and cointegration tests to reduce the likelihood of spurious results.9
The results here are more mixed than the unemployment results. Overall there is some
evidence of a relationship between inﬂation and its own conditional variance. It is less clear
8Ruge-Murcia (2004).
9Our econometric work follows the model by assuming that the conditional variance is predetermined
relative to the level of the inﬂation rate, though the direction of causality could go in the opposite direction
(see, for example, Friedman (1977)).
3whether this relationship is due to asymmetric central bank preferences. When we estimate
the model in diﬀerences, there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence of an inverse relationship
between inﬂation and its conditional variance, as would be implied if asymmetric central
bank preferences were important, in about one third of the countries. When we estimate
the model as a cointegrating relationship, however, the sign of the correlation between
inﬂation and its conditional variance becomes positive in all but one country, which is less
attractive from the perspective of the theory. Since diﬀerencing the data emphasizes higher
frequency movements, rather than the low frequency movements we are most interested in,
we interpret these results to mean that the theoretical channel by which inﬂation volatility
aﬀects inﬂation through asymmetric central bank preferences is not the correct explanation
for the co-movement of inﬂation and its volatility at co-movements.
Our conclusion is that, while it appears at ﬁrst to be a promising candidate, a careful
look at the data suggests that the time inconsistency story coupled with asymmetric central
bank preferences and time varying variance of economic shocks is not a likely cause of the
rise and fall of inﬂation in OECD countries in recent years.
Our paper is most closely related to papers by Ruge-Murcia (2004) and Surico (2006)
who investigate the possibility that economic volatility coupled with asymmetric central
bank preferences interact to explain inﬂation trends. Ruge-Murcia has much the same ap-
proach as take here, though he does not control for spurious results generated by persistence
in inﬂation and the conditional variances. Surico takes a diﬀerent approach to the question,
estimating the degree of asymmetry in preferences from the policy reaction function for the
U.S. Federal Reserve in diﬀerent periods. His research question diﬀers from ours in that he
investigates the possible eﬀect of changes in the degree of asymmetry in preferences, rather
than changes in the variances of the shocks, on inﬂation and ﬁnds that such changes may
account for a sizable fraction of the decline in U.S. inﬂation. Furthermore, he only considers
U.S. inﬂation.
More broadly, our paper ﬁts into the literature investigating the causes of the rise and
fall of U.S. inﬂation. Loosely speaking, this literature bifurcates around the question of
whether the Great Inﬂation was caused by monetary policy errors10 or by adverse shocks.11
The monetary mistakes literature has produced a number of theories of why the U.S. Fed
10See Clarida, Gali, & Gertler (2000), for example.
11Sims and Zha (2006).
4may have performed poorly including misleading real time data12 problems with learning
about key parameters of the economy13 and changing fundamentals, such as the NAIRU,
exacerbating time inconsistency problems.14 Our paper falls into this last category, where
the contribution is the use of the common international experience as a way of disciplining
our empirical work, and the use of changes in economic volatility, rather than the NAIRU,
as the source of the time inconsistency problem.
Finally, our paper is also somewhat related to the empirical literature investigating
asymmetries central bank preferences by examining central bank policy reaction functions
(see footnote 4 for references). Relative to this literature, our paper represents an indi-
rect and somewhat ineﬃcient test of whether central bank preferences exhibit asymmetry.
However, testing whether or not central bank preferences are asymmetric is not the main
objective of our paper, and our approach allows us to focus on the object of our interest:
the link between economic volatility and observed inﬂation outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a model of time inconsistent monetary
policy with asymmetric central bank preferences. Section 3 introduces the spurious regres-
sion problem and presents our estimates of the eﬀect of changing volatility of unemployment
shocks on inﬂation, correcting for this problem. Section 4 examines the relationship between
inﬂation and its own conditional variance, as well as the general case in which inﬂation may
depend on the conditional variance of both inﬂation and unemployment. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Model Overview
In this section we present a model in which monetary policy is time inconsistent due to
asymmetries in the central banker’s loss function. The model begins with an expectations
augmented short run Phillips curve, which ties deviations of unemployment from the NAIRU
to unexpected inﬂation and exogenous shocks:
ut = un + λ(πt − πe
t) + ηt (2.1)
12Orphanides (2002, 2003).
13Sargent (1999), Primiceri (2004).
14Ireland (1999).
5where πt is the rate of inﬂation in period t, πe
t represents households’ expectations of period
t inﬂation, ut is the rate of unemployment, un is the NAIRU, and ηt is an unemployment
shock, where η ∼ N(0,σ2
η). In some applications (for example, Ireland (1999)), the NAIRU
is allowed to vary over time. Here, to simplify the exposition, we use the simplest assump-
tion, which is that the NAIRU is constant.
The central banker does not control inﬂation directly, but rather chooses the level of
some policy instrument, it, which aﬀects inﬂation, subject to some control error θt:
πt = f(it) + θt (2.2)
where f(·) is a monotonic, continuous, diﬀerentiable function and θ ∼ N(0,σ2
θ). This shock
is commonly thought of as a control error, and serves to both introduce exogenous volatility
into the inﬂation process, and break the equality between equilibrium unemployment and
the NAIRU. In the absence of θt (i.e. if the central banker could control inﬂation perfectly),
rational expectations implies that the private sector’s forecasts of inﬂation would always
be correct, implying that unemployment always equals the NAIRU, which does not seem
reasonable.
Private agents have rational expectations, so that
πe
t = E{πt|It}, (2.3)
where It is the information set of the private sector, which contains all information except
the current realizations of the shocks.
The problem facing the central banker in each period is to choose it so as to minimize:
E{L(πt − π∗,ut − u∗)|Ωt}, (2.4)
where L(πt,ut) is the central banker’s loss function, which generally depends on the devia-
tions of inﬂation and unemployment from their targets, denoted by π∗, and u∗, respectively,
and Ωt is the central banker’s information set, which includes all information except the
current realizations of the shocks and equation (2.3).15 The inﬂation target π∗ is generally
exogenous, and is sometimes assumed to be zero. We assume that u∗ is equal to the NAIRU,
thus removing the classic source of inﬂationary bias from the model.16
15Private sector expectations are taken as given by the central bank.
16Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983).
6Since the central banker takes expectations as given, he or she is unable to commit to
a monetary policy rule. Instead, in each period, after the private agents have formed their
expectations but before the realization of the shocks ηt and θt, the central banker chooses
the value of the policy instrument, it. Thus the central banker’s problem is to minimize
(2.4) subject to the constraints given by (2.1) and (2.2).
We assume that the loss function is asymmetric with respect to positive versus negative
deviations from the targets π∗ and u∗. The literature often employs a Linex speciﬁcation
for preferences:17
L(πt,ut) = (eα(πt−π∗) − α(πt − π∗) − 1)/(α2) + Φ(eγ(ut−u∗) − γ(ut − u∗) − 1)/(γ2). (2.5)
In general, when the loss function is asymmetric, the deviation of inﬂation from target
(E(π|I) − π∗) will be a function of the unemployment target, the conditional variance of
inﬂation, and the conditional variance of unemployment. The equilibrium inﬂation rate in
this economy is:
E(π|I) = π∗ − (ασ2
π/2) + (1/α)ln[1 + (αλΦ/γ)(eγ2σ2
u/2 − 1)] (2.6)
where σπ is the conditional variance of inﬂation and σ2
u is the conditional variance of unem-







Asymmetries in the loss function mean that central bankers dislike deviations from target
with one sign more than deviations from target with the other sign. If central bankers
dislike high unemployment more than they dislike low unemployment (i.e. γ > 0), the
central banker would be willing to accept an unemployment rate that is below the target
level on average, in return for a lower chance of suﬀering through a period of very high
unemployment. In this case, periods of highly volatile unemployment will cause the central
banker to pursue inﬂationary policy in an attempt to drive down the average unemployment
rate, so as to insure against high unemployment shocks. Of course, the form of the Phillips
curve (2.1) along with the rational expectations assumption (2.3) implies that the central
bank’s attempts to systematically engineer lower unemployment results, in equilibrium, only
in higher inﬂation.
17Ruge-Murcia (2003a, & 2003b), and Nobay & Peel(2003).
7Similarly, if central bankers’ preferences are asymmetric in the inﬂation rate (or the
deviation of the inﬂation rate from some target), an increase in the volatility of inﬂation
aﬀects the conduct of monetary policy and, consequently, the average inﬂation rate. To
the extent that central bankers dislike high inﬂation more than they dislike low inﬂation
(i.e. α > 0), an increase in the volatility of inﬂation is likely to lead to lower average
inﬂation. Higher volatility of inﬂation causes central bankers to reduce average inﬂation so
as to insure against high inﬂation shocks.
The above intuition assumes α > 0, γ > 0. If α < 0, the central banker dislikes low
inﬂation more than high inﬂation, implying that the central banker raises average inﬂation
when the volatility of inﬂation is high to insure against low inﬂation shocks. Similarly,
if γ < 0, the central banker lowers inﬂation when unemployment is more volatile, in an
attempt to insure against low unemployment shocks. While α < 0, and/or γ < 0 are
theoretically possible, α > 0, γ > 0 is the most intuitively plausible case.
2.1 Empirical Implications
The model takes the conditional volatility of both inﬂation and unemployment as exogenous.
If we take the model seriously, it is reasonable to use single equation methods to estimate
model parameters. From (2.6), inﬂation depends linearly on σ2
π and on the natural log of
the exponential of σ2
u. A linear estimation framework is a reasonable approximation of this




π,j,t + ǫj,t (2.7)
where, j is the country, t is the time period, ǫj,t is an error term, and:
b1 = (γλΦ/2)
b2 = −(α/2).
While individual model parameters cannot be identiﬁed in this framework, it is possible
to relate the signs of various coeﬃcient estimates back to underlying parameters. Of main
interest are the parameters related to the asymmetries in the loss function.
First note that, since λ and Φ are positive by assumption, a positive estimate of b1
implies that γ is positive. This corresponds to the intuitively reasonable case in which
8the central banker dislikes high unemployment more than low unemployment. Similarly,
a negative value of b2 implies that α must be positive, which corresponds to the other
intuitively attractive case, in which the central banker dislikes high inﬂation more than low
inﬂation.
The model nests two special cases: If central bank preferences are symmetric in un-
employment, then γ → 0, and b1 equals zero. Similarly, if central bank preferences are
symmetric in inﬂation, α → 0, corresponding to the case where b2 equals zero.
3 Main Results
In this section we present our main empirical results. To facilitate comparison with
the existing literature, we take the case where central bank preferences are asymmetric in
unemployment but not inﬂation as our baseline model. In this case, the model’s reduced
form solution for the inﬂation rate time series is approximated by the linear regression
equation:
πt = a + b1 · σ2
u,t + ǫt (3.8)
where πt is the inﬂation rate in period t, σ2
u,t is the conditional variance of the unemployment
rate in period t, and ǫt is a white noise error term. Asymmetric preferences imply that the
parameter b1 will be nonzero, being positive (negative) if the central bank prefers deviations
below (above) the natural rate. Note that the more reasonable case, that central bankers
dislike excessively high unemployment more than they dislike excessively low unemployment,
corresponds to the case where b1 is positive.
We estimate the variance of the unemployment rate via the following GARCH(1,1)




ht =   + αw2
t−1 + ωht−1
where wt is the innovation in the unemployment rate and vt is an i.i.d. sequence of zero-
mean and unit-variance random variables. It can be shown (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1994) that
this GARCH(1,1) implies that w2
t has an ARMA(1,1) representation whose autoregressive
coeﬃcient is α+ω. It is worth noting that this implies that α+ω measures the persistence
of the conditional variance. In the limit, α+ω = 1 which deﬁnes the IGARCH(1,1) model.
93.1 Spurious Regression
It would appear natural to estimate the model via a two step process: ﬁrst using (3.9) to
estimate the variance of the unemployment shock, and then estimating (3.8) by OLS. Ruge-
Murcia (2004) conducts essentially this exercise for G-7 countries and ﬁnds some support
for the predictions of the model.18
There is a potential problem with this approach, however. For many countries, both the
inﬂation rate and the conditional variance of the unemployment rate are highly persistent.
As a result, standard estimates of the relationship between inﬂation and the conditional
variance of unemployment may suﬀer from a spurious regression problem.
To investigate this, we constructed the following Monte Carlo experiment. First, the
time series yt,t = 1,...,T, was constructed according to the AR(1) model:
yt = ρyt−1 + ut, ut i.i.d.N(0,1), 0 < ρ ≤ 1. (3.10)
Second, the time series ht,t = 1,...,T was independently constructed as the conditional




ht =   + αw2
t−1 + ωht−1 (3.11)
vt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1)
  = 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ω < 1, α + ω ≤ 1
The regression of yt on a constant and ht was run and a t-test was applied to the (true)
null hypothesis that the regression coeﬃcient on ht equals zero, using a nominal test size of
ﬁve-percent. Table 1 reports the rejection rates for two-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis
that the slope coeﬃcient in the regression of an AR(1) process on an independently gener-
ated GARCH(1,1) process is equal to zero, using a nominal test size of 5-percent (i.e. using
a critical value equal to 1.96). The results are derived from Monte Carlo simulations using
1000 simulations for each parameter combination. T refers to the sample size. Initial values
18Ruge-Murcia actually estimates the model of the unemployment rate and its conditional variance jointly
with (3.8) using quasi-maximum likelihood. He notes, and we have conﬁrmed, that the results obtained by
a two-step procedure in which OLS is applied to (3.8) after the conditional variances are estimated in the
ﬁrst step provide essentially the same results.
10were set equal to zero and 500-period burn-in periods were used. The actual rejection rates,
compiled for 1000 simulations and sample sizes 100, 500, and 2000, are reported.
It is clear from Table 1 that regressions of persistent time series on persistent conditional
variance series suﬀer from the spurious regression problem, with actual rejection rates much
greater than nominal rejection rates for both small and large sample sizes. This is a serious
problem. For example, in Ruge-Murcia (2004), the point estimates of α and ω for France
are 0.12 and 0.80, respectively, based on a sample size of approximately 120 observations.
Assuming that the largest autoregressive root in the inﬂation rate series is at least 0.80, our
results suggest that if in equation (3.8) the coeﬃcient b1 is equal to zero, the null hypothesis
that it is zero would be incorrectly rejected at the ﬁve-percent level over 40-percent of the
time!
This result is not speciﬁc to France. We have conﬁrmed in the larger set of OECD
countries that we examine in the following sections that the null hypothesis that b1 equals
zero is rejected most frequently in countries where the conditional variance of unemployment
is highly persistent. Our conclusion is that this approach to estimating the model and
testing the null hypothesis is likely to over-reject the null in many countries. Findings
of a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between inﬂation and the conditional variance of
unemployment estimated in this framework may well be spurious. In the remainder of the
paper, we attempt to correct for this problem.
3.2 Diﬀerencing
Regressions of the inﬂation rate on the conditional variance of the unemployment rate,
are problematic in those cases where the conditional variance is an exact or approximate
IGARCH process. Neither the asymptotic nor ﬁnite sample properties of regressions with
IGARCH regressors have been developed, other than the simulation results we presented
earlier which showed that such regressions appear to be contaminated by the spurious
regression problem. The problem may be further complicated by the fact that the dependent
variable, i.e. the inﬂation rate, appears to be an exact or approximate unit root process.
Given the highly persistent behavior of the inﬂation rate and, in some cases, the con-
ditional variance of the unemployment rate, it seems reasonable to consider estimating the
model in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Unreported Monte Carlo results suggest that tests of the ﬁrst
11diﬀerenced model do suﬀer from size distortions. However, these distortions were always in
the direction of over-rejecting a true null. Given that our results imply that the null of no
relationship can generally not be rejected, any size distortions in the test would appear to
reinforce, rather than overturn, our conclusions.
To estimate the ﬁrst diﬀerenced model, we collected a data set made up of quarterly
unemployment and CPI-based inﬂation rates for thirteen countries:19 Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The data are taken from the OECD’s Main Economic
Indicators database. We used the largest sample available in each country, which for most
countries spans from the mid to late 1960s until 2004.
We began by estimating the model of the previous section, this time in diﬀerences.
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of 3.8 gives
∆πt = b1∆σ2
u,t + et, (3.12)
where ∆xt = xt − xt−1, and σ2
u,t is the conditional variance of the unemployment rate.20
Assuming that the inﬂation target is constant, the model suggests that the diﬀerenced form
of the regression should be ﬁt without an intercept. We ran the diﬀerenced regression
with and without an intercept. The results with respect to the parameter b1 were virtually
identical and the intercept was not statistically signiﬁcant in any case.21
We ﬁrst tested for a unit root in the unemployment rate and found that the unit root
null could not be rejected for any of these countries. Since the parameter b1 in equation
(3.8) is not identiﬁed in the absence of time-varying conditional heteroskedasticity, we next
tested for ARCH eﬀects in the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the unemployment rate. Each diﬀerenced
unemployment series was ﬁt to an AR(p) model, where p was selected by the AIC, and the
squared residual series was ﬁt to AR(1), AR(2), AR(3), and AR(4) models. We applied
Engle’s (1982) LM test for neglected ARCH eﬀects, and if any of the p-values was less than
19Our conclusions are robust to the use of the GDP deﬂator as the price measure for countries for which
this series is available.
20We also estimated the model using the conditional variance of the unemployment gap, recovered from
a cubic de-trending of the unemployment rate. This allows for the possibility that monetary policy makers
interpret low frequency changes in the unemployment rate as changes in the NAIRU, and target monetary
policy towards the deviations of the actual unemployment rate from the NAIRU. The use of the conditional
variance of the unemployment gap did not change the results substantively.
21The results we report are for the regressions run with an intercept.
12or equal to 10-percent, we took this as evidence of possible conditional heteroskedasticity.22
If the diﬀerenced unemployment series displayed such evidence of conditional heteroskedas-
ticity, we ﬁt the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the rate of inﬂation to the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the estimated
GARCH(1,1) conditional variance series for the diﬀerenced unemployment rate’s innova-
tions.
The results are presented in Table 2. Column 1 of the table reports only the lowest of the
p-values from the LM tests, as we included in the sample countries displaying any evidence
of possible conditional heteroskedasticity. We ﬁnd evidence of time varying conditional
heteroskedasticity in seven out of the 13 countries. In two of these countries (Austria and
the U.K.), the ARCH eﬀects were not persistent, and in both of these cases the estimate
of b1 was positive, though statistically signiﬁcant only in one (Austria) and then only at
the 10% level. In the remaining ﬁve countries, we detected persistent ARCH eﬀects. In
three of these countries, the point estimate of b1 was negative, but statistically signiﬁcant
in only two of these three countries. In the remaining three countries, the estimate of b1
was positive, but not statistically signiﬁcant.
These results suggest that the mechanism posited by the model does not ﬁt very well as
an explanation of time series patterns in inﬂation in our sample of countries. First, there is
no evidence of time variation in the conditional volatility in about half of the countries in
the sample, which suggests that the model cannot explain changing inﬂation rates in these
countries. Furthermore, in about half of the countries for which ARCH eﬀects are present
the estimate of the key parameter, b1, is of the theoretically unattractive sign. In only one
of the 13 countries, Austria, do we ﬁnd both time varying ARCH eﬀects and statistically
signiﬁcant evidence that the conditional variance of unemployment is positively related to
the change in inﬂation, as would be required for the theory to serve as a good explanation
of observed inﬂation trends.
3.3 Cointegration
One problem with the results in the previous section is that diﬀerencing the data empha-
sizes the high frequency features of the data at the expense of lower frequency movements.
Given that our motivation is to ask whether time inconsistency problems can explain long
22The LM test is based on the distribution of the T · R
2 statistic from the regression of the squared
residuals from the AR(p) model.
13run trends in OECD-wide inﬂation, this loss of information at the low frequency is an
unattractive feature of diﬀerencing as a corrective to the spurious regression problem.
Consequently, we would like a solution for the spurious regression problem that pre-
serves information about low frequency movements in the data. Our solution is to re-cast
the model as a cointegrating relationship. Observe, from (2.7) and (3.8), that the model
predicts that inﬂation should inherit the time series properties of the conditional variance
of unemployment. If this conditional variance is I(1), then inﬂation should also be I(1), and
the model predicts that these two variables will be cointegrated. We test this implication
of the theory by applying Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood approach to test for coin-
tegration between a country’s inﬂation rate and the the estimated conditional variance of
unemployment.
We report Johansen’s λ-max test statistic, which tests the null of no-cointegration
against the alternative that the two series are cointegrated. All tests are performed with
unrestricted intercepts and no deterministic time trend component in the VECM. We se-
lected a relatively long lag length (8 lags) in the VECM in the hope of alleviating any
serial correlation problems. Critical values for the statistic, obtained using the procedure
of MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999), are: 12.30 (10%), 14.26 (5%), 18.52 (1%).
Column 4 of Table 2 reports the results of Johansen’s λ-max test.23 The results suggest
there is some support of the hypothesis that long run trends in inﬂation rates are related
to trends in conditional volatility in a cointegrating framework. The null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels for four of the seven countries in our
sample for which there is evidence of time varying ARCH eﬀects.
Under plausible beliefs about the nature of the asymmetry in central bank preferences,
the model predicts that the sign of this relationship is positive. Column 5 of Table 2
reports the sign of the estimated cointegrating vector. Of the four countries for which there
is evidence of a cointegrating relationship, the estimate of b1 has the wrong sign in one of
these (Germany). Thus, viewing the model as a cointegrating relationship does improve its
ﬁt marginally, but does not alter the overall conclusion that there is little evidence that this
mechanism explains OECD inﬂation patterns.
23In the bivariate setting with both series assumed to be unit root processes, Johansen’s λ-max and λ-trace
tests are equivalent, since in both cases the null hypothesis is that the cointegration rank is zero and the
alternative hypothesis is that the cointegration rank is one.
143.4 Subsample Analysis
A concern with the previous results is that they are derived holding central banks’
inﬂation targets constant. Given the large movements in inﬂation and well known changes
in the conduct of monetary policy that took place during our sample period, we would
like to check the robustness of our results to this assumption. Hence, we re-estimate the
model on a more recent subsample of data. In particular, we break the sample in 1979 Q3
and then estimate the model on the recent data only. In essence we disregard the rise of
inﬂation and ask whether or not the model can help explain the decline in inﬂation to the
more recent low and stable levels, with the advantage being that the conduct of monetary
policy, including central banks’ inﬂation targets, are more likely to be constant over the
more recent years.24
As before, we ﬁrst test for time varying ARCH eﬀects in unemployment over the new
sample. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results. We ﬁnd evidence of such eﬀects in ﬁve of
the thirteen countries. Relative to the full sample, Denmark, Germany and the U.S. drop
out of the set of countries for which we ﬁnd time varying ARCH eﬀects in unemployment,
and France joins that set.
We proceed to estimate the theoretical model for these ﬁve countries, ﬁrst diﬀerencing
the data, as in section 3.2, to correct for the spurious regression problem. Column 2 of
the Table 3 reports the estimated b1 coeﬃcients. Of the ﬁve countries for which there is
evidence of time varying ARCH eﬀects in the later sample, only one country (Austria, again)
shows evidence of a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the conditional
volatility of unemployment and the inﬂation rate. Of the remaining four countries, the point
estimate of b1 is negative in two, but statistically signiﬁcant in neither of these.
Again, we are concerned that diﬀerencing the data emphasizes high frequency move-
ments in the data at the expense of the low frequency eﬀects we are most interested in, so
we also estimate the model as a cointegrating relationship. Columns 4 and 5 report the
results from the Johansen cointegration test described in section 3.3. The null hypothesis of
no cointegration is rejected, at conventional signiﬁcance levels, in four of the ﬁve countries
for which we found evidence of time varying conditional heteroskedasticity. In each of these
24Our break date is also widely thought to represent a change in the conduct of monetary policy away
from the approach of the 1970s to the modern regime.
15four cases, the point estimates of b1 are positive, which is the theoretically attractive sign.
Overall, focusing only on the, more recent, decline in inﬂation rather than the whole
rise and fall does not change the results very much. When we estimate the model we ﬁnd
essentially the same results as before: the model ﬁts nicely for Austria, but not elsewhere.
When viewed as a cointegrating relationship, there is stronger evidence in favour of the
model in the more recent data than in the full sample. Even here, however, the evidence
suggests that that the relationships suggested by the model are present in the data for only
about one third of the countries in our sample.
4 Inﬂation Volatility
Given the lack of support for the view that changes in the conditional variance of un-
employment cause changes in inﬂation, we turn our attention to the case where preferences
are asymmetric in inﬂation, but not unemployment. The model’s reduced form solution in
this case results in a linear equation relating π to its conditional variance:
πt = a + b2 · σ2
π,t + ǫt (4.13)
We estimate the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences, as both the inﬂation rate and the conditional
variance of the inﬂation rate exhibit high persistence. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of 4.13 gives:
∆πt = b2∆σ2
π,t + et, (4.14)
which forms the basis of our estimation. 25 Asymmetric preferences in inﬂation imply
that the parameter b2 will be nonzero, being negative (positive) if the central bank prefers
deviations below (above) the target rate of inﬂation. Note that for positive inﬂation rates, as
observed in our sample, the more reasonable case is that central bankers dislike excessively
high inﬂation more than they dislike excessively low inﬂation, which corresponds to the case
where b2 is negative.
As in the previous case, the slope coeﬃcient in 4.14 is only identiﬁed if the conditional
variance is time-varying, so we began by testing for ARCH eﬀects in the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the inﬂation rate using the procedure outlined above for the unemployment rate. If the
25As before, the results with respect to the parameter b2 in regressions with and without an intercept
were virtually identical and the intercept was not statistically signiﬁcant in any case. The reported results
include an intercept.
16inﬂation series displayed evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity, we ﬁt the series to a
GARCH-M regression with a GARCH(1,1) error speciﬁcation, using the quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator to get an estimate of the conditional variance of the inﬂation rate. We
then estimate the slope coeﬃcient, b2, by ﬁtting the ﬁrst diﬀerence of inﬂation to the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the estimated conditional variance series.26
Results are presented in columns 1-3 of Table 4. First oﬀ, we ﬁnd evidence of a time
varying conditional variance in inﬂation in 10 of the countries in the sample. Of these 10
countries, the ARCH eﬀects are not persistent in three cases. In each of these cases, the
estimate of b2 is both negative and statistically signiﬁcant. In the remaining six countries,
for which we ﬁnd evidence on persistent ARCH eﬀects, the estimates of b2 are positive
but not statistically signiﬁcant in two countries, and negative in four countries, though not
statistically signiﬁcantly in three of the latter.
As before, we are concerned that by diﬀerencing the data we lose information on low
frequency movements. Again, we address this problem by adopting a cointegration perspec-
tive, and apply Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood approach to test for cointegration
between a country’s inﬂation rate and the the estimated conditional volatility of inﬂation.
As column 4 of Table 4 shows, there is strong support for the view that inﬂation and
the conditional volatility of inﬂation are cointegrated. Of the 10 countries for which there
is evidence of time varying heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is
rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels for seven. Column 5 reports the estimates of b2 in
the cointegrating vector. Here we ﬁnd that, in all cases but one, the estimates of b2 are
positive. However, since the most plausible version of central bank preferences would imply
a negative b2, it is unclear that these results represent evidence in favor of the theory.
The results in this section are mixed. In the diﬀerenced version of the model, there is
a statistically signiﬁcant relationship of the correct sign in 5 of the 10 countries for which
we ﬁnd evidence of time varying ARCH eﬀects in inﬂation. However, when we turn to
26For completeness, we also analyzed the eﬀect of time-varying conditional variances using the level of
inﬂation, by ﬁtting a GARCH-M in inﬂation as suggested by equation 4.13. We found evidence of conditional
heteroskedasticity in the CPI-based inﬂation rate for 10 of the 18 countries in the sample (Australia, Austria,
Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States). Of these 10
countries, all except for Austria had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient on the
estimated conditional variance of the inﬂation rate in the GARCH-M regression. All 10 of these countries
displayed persistent conditional heteroskedasticity, with the sum of the estimated GARCH(1,1) coeﬃcients
exceeding 0.75. In 9 cases, the GARCH(1,1) coeﬃcients exceeded 0.960 and in ﬁve cases the constraint that
the sum of the GARCH(1,1) coeﬃcients cannot exceed unity was binding.
17the cointegration estimation, the sign of the relationship changes, suggesting that the time
inconsistency story may not be the correct explanation for the co-movement of inﬂation
and its volatility. Overall, while there does appear to be evidence of a relationship between
inﬂation and its conditional volatility, the results do not represent compelling evidence in
favor of the theoretical model as a driver of inﬂation trends. Even in the best case, which
is the diﬀerenced estimates, the model ﬁts in only ﬁve of the 13 countries in the sample.
4.1 Unemployment and Inﬂation Volatility
In the previous sections we examined separately the hypothesis that changes in the
conditional variance of unemployment cause changes in inﬂation and the hypothesis that
changes in the conditional variance of inﬂation drive inﬂation trends. However, central
bank preferences may be asymmetric in both inﬂation and unemployment. In this case, the
conditional variance of both inﬂation and unemployment should aﬀect inﬂation, meaning
that our previous results suﬀer from an omitted variable problem.
Consequently, we estimate the model with asymmetric preferences in both inﬂation and
unemployment. The model’s reduced form solution in this case results in a linear equation
relating π to the conditional variance of π and u:
πt = a + b1 · σ2
u,t + b2 · σ2
π,t + ǫt (4.15)
We estimate the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences, as both the inﬂation rate and the conditional
variance of the inﬂation rate exhibit high persistence. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of 4.15 gives:
∆πt = b1∆σ2
u,t + b2∆σ2
π,t + et, (4.16)
which forms the basis of our estimation. As in the previous cases, the results with respect
to the parameters b1, and b2 in regressions ﬁt with and without an intercept were virtually
identical and the intercept was not statistically signiﬁcant in any case.
Model 4.16 is only relevant for countries in which the conditional variance of both
unemployment and inﬂation is time-varying. For these countries, we estimate the slope
coeﬃcients, b1 and b2, by ﬁtting the ﬁrst diﬀerence of inﬂation to the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
conditional variance series, where these series are estimated as described in the previous
subsections. The main limitation of this analysis being that there are only ﬁve countries for
18which both inﬂation and unemployment display evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity:
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the U.K..
The results are presented in Table 5. In the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation (columns 1-3) only
two of the 10 estimated slope coeﬃcients, are statistically signiﬁcant: the coeﬃcient on the
volatility of unemployment for Denmark, and the volatility of inﬂation for Germany. In
both cases, these coeﬃcients take on the theoretically unattractive sign.
Again, we also apply Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood approach to test for coin-
tegration between a country’s inﬂation rate and the the estimated conditional volatilities
of unemployment and inﬂation. In the tri-varate case, critical values for the statistic are:
18.8928 (10%), 21.1314 (5%), 25.8650 (1%). The results, reported in columns 4-6 of the
table, are that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at standard signiﬁcance
levels for three of the ﬁve countries. In this case, the estimates of b1 have the correct sign
but, as before, the estimates of b2 are positive rather than negative.27
Overall, these results, though limited in scope, suggest that the conclusions of the previ-
ous sections are not sensitive to the possibility that central bank preferences are asymmetric
in both inﬂation and unemployment.
5 Conclusion
The results presented in this paper provide little support for the view that the interaction
of asymmetric central bank preferences and the volatilities of inﬂation and unemployment
are important determinants of inﬂation. The data does not support the view that the
volatility of unemployment helps explains inﬂation. Estimated coeﬃcients on measures of
this volatility are generally not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and frequently
possess the wrong sign. In the best case (the cointegration estimates in the more recent
sample) the theory seems capable of explaining inﬂation outcomes in only one third of the
countries in the sample.
The results concerning the relevance of asymmetric preferences in inﬂation are more
diﬃcult to interpret. There is some evidence of a relationship between inﬂation and its
own volatility, but this relationship only takes on the sign suggested by the theory when
27In this case, however, there may be multiple cointegrating vectors, so the interpretation of these coeﬃ-
cients is unclear.
19we diﬀerence the data, which emphasizes the shorter run features of the data. Even in this
case, the evidence statistically signiﬁcant in only ﬁve of the 13 countries we examine.
Overall, our conclusion is that while it appears promising on the surface, a careful
investigation of the data does not provide much support for the view that the combination
of asymmetric central bank preferences and changing economic volatility is an important
driver of recent inﬂation trends in OECD countries.
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Actual Rejection Rates for a Test with Nominal Size Equal to 0.05
T=100
(α,ω) ρ = 0.00 ρ = 0.40 ρ = 0.80 ρ = 0.90 ρ = 0.95 ρ = 0.99 ρ = 1.00
(0.1,0.1) 0.054 0.083 0.103 0.091 0.091 0.110 0.113
(0.1,0.4) 0.044 0.118 0.203 0.233 0.243 0.239 0.241
(0.1,0.8) 0.043 0.168 0.416 0.495 0.568 0.611 0.595
(0.1,0.9) 0.049 0.207 0.474 0.596 0.698 0.733 0.755
(0.01,0.99) 0.052 0.202 0.495 0.631 0.665 0.765 0.749
(0.4,0.1) 0.065 0.092 0.162 0.184 0.196 0.181 0.194
(0.8,0.1) 0.042 0.108 0.198 0.253 0.276 0.285 0.276
(0.9,0.1) 0.043 0.106 0.232 0.266 0.303 0.300 0.312
(0.95,0.05) 0.043 0.102 0.230 0.252 0.240 0.270 0.305
(1.0,0.0) 0.070 0.105 0.181 0.225 0.239 0.260 0.275
T=2000
(α,ω) ρ = 0.00 ρ = 0.40 ρ = 0.80 ρ = 0.90 ρ = 0.95 ρ = 0.99 ρ = 1.00
(0.1,0.1) 0.044 0.079 0.090 0.108 0.087 0.106 0.114
(0.1,0.4) 0.067 0.140 0.205 0.233 0.236 0.279 0.265
(0.1,0.8) 0.057 0.186 0.405 0.530 0.598 0.627 0.667
(0.1,0.9) 0.040 0.180 0.518 0.624 0.727 0.837 0.877
(0.01,0.99) 0.056 0.201 0.497 0.641 0.766 0.883 0.941
(0.4,0.1) 0.046 0.114 0.173 0.190 0.213 0.238 0.244
(0.8,0.1) 0.052 0.136 0.247 0.276 0.340 0.352 0.357
(0.9,0.1) 0.035 0.129 0.242 0.291 0.341 0.331 0.388
(0.95,0.05) 0.040 0.114 0.227 0.298 0.334 0.336 0.357
(1.0,0.0) 0.051 0.117 0.233 0.282 0.279 0.304 0.332
24Table 2. Inﬂation and the Conditional Variance of Unemployment
LM-test Diﬀerenced Cointegration
Country p-values ˆ b1 α + ω λ-max ˆ b1
Australia 0.20 - - - -
Austria 0.10 106.4* 0.124 7.43 53.34
Canada 0.00 1.5 0.662 20.73*** 5.88
Denmark 0.00 0.9 0.995 9.37 31.90
Finland 0.26 - - - -
France 0.42 - - - -
Germany 0.06 -18.4 0.716 26.03*** -15.12
Italy 0.11 - - - -
Japan 0.30 - - - -
Norway 0.56 - - - -
Sweden 0.00 -39.2** 0.903 9.62 -38.96
UK 0.00 10.8 0.301 20.19*** 35.41
US 0.00 -7.1** 0.897 17.18** 7.93
Notes: * = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
25Table 3. Inﬂation and the Conditional Variance of Unemployment: Late Sample
LM-test Diﬀerencing Cointegration
Country p-values ˆ b1 α + ω λ-max ˆ b1
Australia 0.95 - - - -
Austria 0.02 85.41** 0.224 12.48* 82.60
Canada 0.01 -0.24 0.775 20.21*** 5.19
Denmark 0.23 - - - -
Finland 0.25 - - - -
France 0.05 11.07 0.305 32.03*** 42.12
Germany 0.29 - - - -
Italy 0.23 - - - -
Japan 0.52 - - - -
Norway 0.50 - - - -
Sweden 0.00 -9.6 0.922 8.75 -22.92
UK 0.00 66.3 0.974 13.02* 161.92
US 0.17 - - - -
Notes: * = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
26Table 4. Inﬂation and the Conditional Variance of Inﬂation
LM-test Diﬀerencing Cointegration
Country p-values ˆ b2 α + ω λ-max ˆ b2
Australia 0.01 -0.037** 0.350 24.27*** 0.097
Austria 0.00 -0.078*** 1.000 13.95* 0.006
Canada 0.01 -0.087 0.732 11.86 -0.085
Denmark 0.04 0.026 0.928 15.42** 0.118
Finland 0.01 -0.080 0.918 10.33 0.788
France 0.18 - - - -
Germany 0.05 -17.363** 0.390 18.42** 51.548
Italy 0.01 0.040 1.000 20.11*** 0.260
Japan 0.00 -0.066*** 0.369 24.94*** 0.213
Norway 0.00 -0.004 0.644 3.90 0.025
Sweden 0.36 - - - -
UK 0.00 -0.113*** 0.332 19.93*** 0.286
US 0.14 - - - -
Notes: * = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
27Table 5. Inﬂation and the Conditional Variance of Inﬂation and Unemployment
Diﬀerencing Cointegration
Country ˆ b1 ˆ b2 α + ω λ-max ˆ b1 ˆ b2
Australia - - - - - -
Austria 60.66 0.013 0.993 12.37 71.77 0.000
Canada 0.05 -0.03 0.722 19.73* 13.70 0.06
Denmark -27.86** 0.01 0.929 18.67 30.67 0.06
Finland - - - - - -
France - - - - - -
Germany -1.595 73.59*** 0.342 27.86*** 2.64 5.84
Italy - - - - - -
Japan - - - - - -
Norway - - - - - -
Sweden - - - - - -
UK -33.42 0.03 0.337 28.64*** 38.68 0.09
US - - - - - -
Notes: * = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
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